To set a series of conditions before any serious peace-making efforts, Norway has exposed its imperfections in meeting-the-minds of the anxious parties in Sri Lanka. The government of Sri Lanka has good reason for their concerns, although they were careful not to show that in public. The Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store had the audacity to state that the process is must be owned by the parties, so they own the upside and the downside and said "we are facilitators to help toward the upside but we can only do as much as third parties themselves want” and that he has good reason for insisting on the conditions. But FM Store should realise that Sri Lanka have reservations about Norway and conditions for their participation too.
Along with millions of Sri Lankans, I am gravely troubled by the on-going conflict and the entry of Norwegians as pseudo peace brokers. While searching for answers on how and why we ended up with a dishonest broker and what perils awaits Sri Lankans, I came across some challenging approaches to conflict resolutions by the Conflict Research Consortium of University of Colorado that every Sri Lankan must get to know. Having measured what makes a successful peace-maker I consider it is a worthwhile reading for all those wish to understand what I call the “Illusive Norwegian Gambit”- the conspiracy to undermine the Sri Lankans by purposely lacking the fundamental peacemaking qualities to succeed. After reading this article the reader will be able to answer if their intention is malicious or plain stupidity.
In his interview Store insisted that "Norway comes to these kinds of situations with a toolbox that does not carry economic, political or any other dimension." But I challenge this view by pointing out that their ‘toolbox’ contains only a rusty ratchet, not an array of tools to fit various circumstances as any determined broker would bring along to succeed. Students of our conflict with the LTTE would find it ludicrous that he chose to claim it is the strength of their approach because they do not have a vested interest in the situation itself and that they can be a constructive and committed third party. I beg to differ – they are blatantly partisan towards the LTTE.
Though the role of a negotiator is testing and complex I strongly urge the Norwegians to read in earnest the best-known conflict resolution book, Getting to Yes (1981) by Roger Fisher and William Ury which encourages four fundamental principles of negotiation that we have NOT seen from the Norwegians: 1) separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not positions; 3) invent options for mutual gain; and 4) insist on objective criteria. “Principled Negotiation” is the name given to the interest-based approach to negotiation.
It suggests further that the negotiator should separate the people from the problem means separating relationship issues (or "people problems") from substantive issues, and dealing with them independently. People problems, Fisher et al observe, tend to involve problems of perception, emotion, and communication. Perceptions are important because they define the problem and the solution. While there is an "objective reality," that reality is interpreted differently by different people in different situations. When different parties have different understandings of their dispute effective negotiation may be very difficult to achieve. Norwegians via SLMM had only managed to isolate the warring parties over the last three years.
It would be pretty optimistic on the part of Norwegians wishing that Sri Lankans do not possess quality that bring fruitful outcome. I contend that only advance knowledge can outsmart or outfox the “Illusive Norwegian Gambit” and Fisher et al suggest that there are seven basic strategies to seriously to handle the problems of perception. We need to become smarter this way:
- First, try to see the situation from LTTE’s perspective. We do not have to agree with their perceptions of the situation. But it is important to understand what they think and feel, and why they think and feel as they do.
- Second, don't deduce LTTE’s intentions from our own fears. It is common to assume that LTTE plans to do just what we fear they will do. This sort of suspicious attitude makes it difficult to accurately perceive LTTE’s real intentions; whatever they do we will assume the worst.
- Third, avoid blaming LTTE for the problem. Blame, even if it is deserved, will only make LTTE defensive. Even worse, they may attack you in response. Blame is generally counterproductive.
- Fourth, discuss each other's perceptions. Explicit discussion of each side's perceptions will help both sides to better understand each other (see the first point). And discussion will help each side to avoid projecting their fears onto one another (see the third point). Also, such discussion may reveal shared perceptions. Acknowledging shared perceptions can strengthen the parties' relationship, and facilitate productive negotiations.
- Fifth, seek opportunities to act inconsistently with LTTE’s misperceptions. That is, try to disappoint LTTE’s worst beliefs and expectations about us. Just as it is important for us to have an accurate perception of our opponent, it is also important for them to have an accurate perception of us. Disappointing LTTE’s negative or inaccurate beliefs will help to change those beliefs.
- Sixth, give LTTE a stake in the outcome by making sure they participate in the negotiation process. If LTTE does not feel involved in the negotiation process, then they are unlikely to feel involved in its outcome. Conversely, if they feel that the process is in part their process, then they are more likely to accept its conclusion as their conclusion.
- Seventh, make our proposals consistent with the principles and self-image of LTTE. All the parties to a negotiation need to be able to reconcile the agreement with their principles and self-image. That is, they need to feel the final agreement does not compromise their integrity. Proposals which are consistent with LTTE’s principles and which do not undermine their self-image are more likely to be accepted.
Fisher et al consider communication problems to be "people problems" as well. They list three types of communication problems. For over three years the Norwegians did nothing of this. First, they didn’t even know that the disputants of our conflict were not talking to each other. As often as we find out, their comments are formally addressed to the opponents, they are actually addressing to an outside audience. They are grandstanding to the world opinion. A second communication problem arises when parties are not listening to each other. Rather than listening attentively to the opponent, parties may instead be planning their own response, or listening to their own constituency. Finally, even when parties are listening and talking to each other, misunderstandings and misinterpretations may occur. Fisher et al suggest techniques for minimizing communication problems. From what have seen thus far, Norwegians have only mismanaged communications leading to mistrust of among the two antagonists.
Negotiating about “interests” means negotiating about things that people really want and need, not what they say that want or need. Often, these are not the same. People tend to take extreme positions that are designed to counter their opponents’ positions. If asked why they are taking that position, it often turns out that the underlying reasons--their true interests and needs--are actually compatible, not mutually exclusive. However, as we have seen from day-one the Norwegians were bias towards the LTTE, providing secret funds for their infamous “charitable” activities and communication equipment over the years, thereby undermining its credibility as an impartial peace broker. This is hardly the role the Norwegians had played so far, granting favours to the LTTE to build up their military.
Further, I have serious problems with the Norwegians’ totally lack ingenuity. They have not focused on common interests of the parties or even forcing the two disputing parties to fulfill a principle--invent options for mutual gain. This means Norwegians should look for new solutions to the problem that will allow both sides to win, not just fight over the original positions which assume that for one side to win, the other side must lose. Do they have anything that resemble ‘options” in their toolbox?
One rule is to insist on objective criteria for decisions. While not always available, if some outside, objective criteria for fairness can be found, this can greatly simplify the negotiation process. For example, if union and management are struggling over a contract, they can look to see what other similar companies have agreed to use as an outside objective criteria. If people are negotiating over the price of a car or a house, they can look at what similar houses or cars have sold for. This gives both sides more guidance as to what is "fair," and makes it hard to oppose offers in this range. A seasoned peace broker would have this skill in the ‘toolbox’ to deal with under differing circumstances.
Now, this is my fundamental issue with the Norway’s role as a mediator, they have no prior peace making experience to relate to and move forward with the peace making effort without frustrating the parties on lack of progress.
Fisher et al advise negotiators (in this case Norwegians) to know what their alternatives are. If you don’t know what your alternatives to a negotiated agreement are, you might accept an agreement that is far worse than the one you might have gotten, or reject one that is far better than you might otherwise achieve.
I find that there are fundamental ingredients lacking with Norwegian as the peace facilitator to help make peace. As such, we must be pretty wary about the outcome due to inherent flaws with the Norwegians and to offset we must be mindful of what these are to strategise for all eventualities:
Third Party Not Effective or Credible
In the even the third-party mediator lacks the ability or credibility to work effectively with the parties, if parties do not trust the mediator's fairness, they ought to withdraw from the negotiations – We should reserve the right to dismiss Norway forthrightly without worrying about international opinion.
Utilize a Skilled, Credible Third Party
Sometimes a third party is not credible or reliable. They may have a conflict-of-interest and work for a solution that favours themselves and/or one side of the conflict more than the other, or they may not have the skills necessary to intervene successfully. By providing a third party who is skilled and credible, these problems can be surmounted, and often significant progress can be made where none was made before. – We MUST include India, UN or line-up a credible substitute peace broker if this is the case.
Poor Process or Structure
The procedures used can be so flawed that it cannot succeed, even when the potential for a win-win outcome exists - It is the sole responsibility of the Norwegians to come up with an effective structure that has the capacity to identifying ripe times for negotiation, soft & hard bargaining identifying and pursuing negotiable sub-Issues, negotiation loopbacks etc.
Failure to Understand an Opponent's Perspective
People often view conflicts from very different perspectives depending upon such things as cultural background, economic position, and religious beliefs. In order for the parties to communicate effectively, they need to understand (though not necessarily agree with) the perspectives of other parties to a conflict. (Remember what the Norwegian FM Store said “Norway comes to these kinds of situations with a toolbox that does not carry economic, political or any other dimension” – So why are they involved?
Failed Mediation
If mediation is tried and fails because of poor timing, poor process, or a poor mediator, disputants may be unwilling to try it again, even when conditions are better – Will this be the Norwegians asset when they assume this role or back off when things get tough?
Limits to Agreement: Better Alternatives
Opportunities for resolving disputes by voluntary agreement are limited by the parties' alternatives to that agreement. This is because disputants will usually not accept any agreement that is worse for them than the outcome which they think they can obtain in another way. For example, if a negotiated agreement requires compromises that they think they can avoid with a show of force, force will likely be used instead of negotiation. Sometimes, however, parties have unreasonable expectations of what they stand to achieve from negotiation or the continuation of the conflict. If they think they can win more by continuing the conflict than is possible in any circumstance, they may continue to pursue the conflict, even when it will actually do them more harm than good – This has been the classic strong arm strategy of LTTE, clearly not conducive for reaching peace. Question is whether the Norwegians possess the wisdom to negate such manoeuvring.
No Legitimate Party to Negotiate With
Sometimes one side wants to negotiate, but there is no legitimate representative of the other side to negotiate with. If an attempt is made to negotiate with someone who does not legitimately represent the opponent, the effort is likely to fail – The Government of Sri Lanka is legitimate, but why Norway is insisting that the LTTE is the sole representative of Tamils?
Wrong (or Missing) Parties at the Table
If negotiation or mediation is undertaken with the questionable parties at the negotiating table, the results will not be successful. Typical problems are that the people at the table do not really represent the constituencies or groups that they are supposed to represent, or they do not have decision-making authority, or even links to it. Another problem is that critical parties are missing from the table--either because they were not invited, or because they chose not to come. Either way, this is likely to cause problems later on when a decision is reached which does not represent the interests of all the concerned or affected groups - Why not bring in other Tamil parties to weaken LTTE?
Negotiate with Legitimate Representatives
Negotiation with illegitimate representatives seldom works. Parties involved in negotiation need to make sure that the people they are negotiating with really do represent the constituency they purport to represent. If they do not, it is essential to find out who does legitimately represent that group and negotiate with them. If a group has no legitimate representation of the people they claim to represent, there is no point in negotiating until that can be established – This is the million dollar question why are we dealing with LTTE?
Our negotiations must take place from a position of strength not only coming from the military superiority, but also from knowing the key fundamentals of winning the peace negotiations. Fisher et al do furnish us with some clues to deal with some critical ones. There will be no doubt that strong emotions will arise, we need remedies to overcome and seek ways on how best to advance our interests. Since emotions lie at the core of many difficult conflicts, they must be addressed and cannot be simply suppressed. We should be prepared for very strong emotions coming from the LTTE, they may find it difficult to calmly assess the situation and determine any course of action.
Interestingly, in Getting to Yes, Fisher et al argue that almost all disputes can be resolved with principled negotiation. They reject the notion that some conflicts are inherently win-lose or that positional bargaining is ever a superior approach. Other theorists, however, disagree--as do we. Principled negotiation is an excellent tool to use in many disputes, but they have found that it needs to be supplemented with other approaches in the case of intractable conflicts, such as geographical, cultural and ethnicity. It also is more attuned to U.S. and Western European cultures which emphasize rational cost-benefit analysis, and de-emphasize the importance of relationships and emotions. Cultures which see relationship issues as central aspects of the conflict may find principled negotiation less useful. Given this, I argue if Norway the right negotiator, who is clearly blind to the sentiments of Sri Lankans, instead does champion the Tamils’ cause as a legitimate mass extermination by a majority.
Whether Norway is intentionally leading us to believe that they are worthy peacemakers or an honest broker who is clueless about peacemaking only time will tell. However, they have calculatedly developed a clandestine relationship with the LTTE over the years and that cause me to conclude they have in mind an “Illusive Norwegian Gambit” to hoodwink Sri Lanka. Here, caution is the name of the game for the Government of Sri Lanka, being conscious throughout of what Norwegians are up to with LTTE is the science in winning the best deal for Sri Lanka. If the negotiations begin to go astray they must have graceful exit strategies as time is on their hands. It is the LTTE who are desperate for a deal to deliver a fantasy homeland to Tamils. God luck Sri Lanka.
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